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Scientific research on the banking crisis 2007-08 has answered many important 
questions according to generally accepted methodological standards. However, there 
remains at least one outstanding question that has not been answered with 
methodological accuracy: What caused the severe USA banking crisis 2007-08? To 
address this question the paper uses a counterfactual definition of ‘cause,’ 
distinguishes between separable and non-separable causes, and employs a well-posed 
methodology for the causation analysis of singular events. In addition, first causes and 
preponderant causes are distinguished. The main result of this paper is that the 
preponderant causes of the banking crisis 2007-08 were securitization and ignorance. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Financial instability happens when shocks to the financial system distort the 
information flows in such a way that the financial sector finds increasingly difficult to 
perform the task of channelling funds to productive investment opportunities. Those 
shocks make the adverse selection and moral hazard problems worse, and thereby, 
lending tends to dry-up. It is generally agreed that a financial crisis is an extreme case 
of financial instability.1  
 
Although the first major crisis of the twenty first century is usually referred to as the 
‘financial crisis 2007-2008,’ it should be clear that the expression ‘banking crisis 
2007-2008’ is a better term. Distinguishing banking crises from the broader category 
of financial crises is not a mere terminological quibble. It is methodologically 
improper to identify the group of financial crises F with the collection of banking 
crises A because every banking crisis is a financial crisis, but the converse is not true.  
Consequently, we can study the characteristics of A most effectively if they are not 
merged with the characteristics of other financial crises such as currency crashes and 
sovereign debt defaults. 
 
As Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a), (2008b) have documented, financial crisis are often 
linked to economic growth, capital inflows and financial innovation. Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2008a) provide a panoramic view of eight centuries of financial crises “dating 
from England’s fourteenth-century default to the current United States sub-prime 
financial crisis.” These authors deal with five types of financial crises (banking crises, 
currency crashes, inflation outbursts, domestic default, and external default) and use 
quantitative thresholds and events to date crisis episodes.  
 
Inspection of the annotated appendix in (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008a, esp. pp.75-88) 
shows that it is important to realize that not all financial crises are banking crises. 
Likewise, Calomiris (2009) signalizes that it is methodologically improper to mix 
banking crises with other financial crises indiscriminately: “Banking crises must be 
distinguished from the broader category of ‘financial crises’.” (Calomiris 2009, p. 5) 
 
The assertion that the collection of banking crises A is a proper subset of the set of 
financial crises F presupposes a definition of the term ‘banking crisis’ allowing us to 
decide whether a crisis can be considered as an element of A or not. Any crisis where 
the shock provoking financial instability directly affects the banking sector (regulated, 
unregulated or a combination of the two) in a fundamental way is called a banking 
crisis. Banking crises can manifest themselves by either panics conducive to a sudden 
stop of the credit market or waves of bank insolvency. Calomiris (2009) has shown 
that sometimes the two aspects (panic and insolvency) occur concurrently, but at other 
times they do not coincide. This means that the collection of banking crises A consists 
                                                 
1 This broad definition of financial crisis was introduced by Mishkin (1999) to analyse the 1997-1999 
financial crises in Mexico and east Asia. 
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of two subsets A1 (banking panics) and A2 (banking insolvencies) with non-empty 
intersection and neither A1 is a proper subset of A2 nor A2 is a proper subset of A1. 
 
While each banking crisis no doubt is distinct, comparative historical analysis shows 
that the antecedents and aftermaths of banking crises –in both rich economies and 
emerging markets– have similar patterns in housing and equity prices, unemployment, 
and government revenues and debt. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009c). All banking crises 
have an onset, an outbreak and a culmination. Severe banking crises end with 
pervasive Knightian uncertainty and sudden stops. 
 
The first severe banking crisis of the twenty first century started on June 20, 2007 
when two highly leveraged Bear Sterns-managed hedge funds collapsed due to their 
investment in sub-prime asset-backed securities (this event spread the news that 
AAA-rated securities were not safe), exploded out of control on September 15, 2008 
with the fall of Lehman Brothers, and culminated with a sudden freeze in the market 
for short-term, secured borrowing in October 2008.  
 
There are several points of general agreement about the USA banking crisis 2007-08, 
including the following six. First and most obvious, the culmination of the banking 
crisis was a singular event – in that it was a dated and non-replicable phenomenon 
occurring at a particular location. Greenspan (2008). Second, the crisis displayed 
multiple causative factors. Diamond and Rajan (2009). Third, the crisis was 
stupefyingly complex. Brunnermeir (2009). Fourth, the financial system was 
devoured by its own creations; in particular, innovations in the field of structured 
finance allowed trillions of dollars of risky assets to be transformed into financial 
products that were far riskier than originally advertised. Coval et al. (2009). Fifth, the 
crisis was triggered by the burst of the USA real estate bubble and was magnified by 
the extreme concentration of risk in a highly leveraged financial sector. Caballero et 
al. (2008). And sixth, the rules governing the banking system encouraged risky 
practices. 
 
The last point deserves a special comment. Banks do not operate in a vacuum. Their 
activities take place within a milieu that includes, but it is not limited to, the political 
environment and the microeconomic rules of the banking game, such as the rules that 
govern the operations of each bank (prudential supervisory rules, protective rules, 
etc.). According to Curie (2006, 2010), the set of microeconomic rules of the banking 
game is a key explanatory factor of banking stability (instability). This point is also 
forcibly made by Calomiris (2009). In his review of the history of banking crises, 
(Calomiris, 2009, p. 4) shows that “When the political equilibrium governing the rules 
of the banking game changed for the better (worse) in a particular country, previously 
unstable (stable) banking systems became stable (unstable).” 
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Beyond those points of general agreement, there are many questions that will be 
debated by academics, policymakers, and lawmakers for decades. One of the 
outstanding questions is what caused the USA banking crisis 2007-08. 
 
To examine the causes of the financial crisis, the USA Congress created a bipartisan 
panel of ten members led by Phil Angelides, known as the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission. The Commission interviewed hundreds of witnesses and collected 
additional evidence from a variety of sources, including case study investigations of 
financial firms such as the American International Group, Bear Stearns, Citygroup, 
Fannie Mae, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, and Moody’s. 
   
In January 2011, the Commission issued the first official report2 on the causes of the 
2008 financial meltdown. Three compelling points can be made in relation to the 
FCIR: (a)  the FCIR was virtually ignored by the academic community, probably due 
to the lack of analytical rigor and suspicion of political bias; (b)  the collection of 
possible causes mentioned in the FCIR is all-embracing; and (c) there was no unique 
set of possible causes. 
 
As can be found in the FCIR, it was not possible for the Commission to reach a 
bipartisan agreement on the causes of the USA banking crisis. According to the 
majority’s conclusions, the fundamental causes of the crisis are the following eight: 
(1) Widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision; (2) Dramatic failures 
of corporate governance and risk management at many systemically important 
financial institutions; (3) Combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and 
lack of transparency; (4) Government ill prepared and inconsistent; (5) Systemic 
breakdown in accountability and ethics; (6) Collapsing of mortgage-lending standards 
and mortgage securitization; (7) Over-the-counter derivatives; and (8) Failures of 
credit rating agencies. (FCIR, 2011, esp. pp. xv-xxviii). 
 
Some members of the Commission found areas of substantial disagreement with the 
majority’s conclusions and presented dissent views. (FCIR, 2011, pp. 413-450). For 
example, in one of the dissenting statements there is an explicit list of ten essential 
causes of the crisis: I. Credit bubble; II. Housing bubble; III. Nontraditional 
mortgages; IV. Credit ratings and securitizations; V. Financial institutions 
concentrated correlated risk; VI. Leverage and liquidity risk; VII. Risk of contagion; 
VIII. Common shock; IX. Financial shock and panic; and X. Financial crisis causes 
economic crisis. (FCIR, 2011, pp. 413-439). 
 
From the methodological viewpoint, the biggest problem with the conclusions of the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Report lies in the fact that they are not derived from a clearly 
formulated analytical framework. In particular, the report in question (a) has no 
explicit definition of ‘cause’; (b) does not distinguish between separable and non-
                                                 
2 The title of the report is The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (FCIR). 
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separable causes; and (c) has no explicit methodology for causation analysis. 
Furthermore, it is not inconceivable that there may have been biases in the 
conclusions of both Democrats and Republicans arising from the fact that this is a 
politically motivated document.3 
 
Leaving aside political stances, it should be emphasized that a narrative approach to 
causality is fruitful as a first approximation but not as a second, for one fundamental 
methodological reason. There must be an analytical framework in which to evaluate 
the claim that one or more factors are the causes of a particular economic event. 
 
To shed light on the answer on what were the causes of the USA banking crisis 2007-
08, the paper uses a counterfactual definition of ‘cause,’ distinguishes between 
separable and non-separable causes, and employs a well-posed methodology for the 
causation analysis of singular events. In addition, first causes and preponderant causes 
are distinguished. The main result in this paper is that the preponderant causes of the 
banking crisis 2007-08 were securitization and ignorance. 
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 succinctly describes the banking 
crisis in order to obtain a source of raw material to isolate plausible causative factors. 
Section 3 sketches the counterfactual methodology for causality analysis. Section 4 
compiles a list of plausible causative factors underlying the financial meltdown and 
discusses their separability. Section 5 uses the counterfactual methodology to 
structure a proof of causality in the context of the USA banking crisis 2007-08. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Crisis intertwined phases 
 
Not surprisingly, the banking crisis 2007-08 has originated an explosion of articles. In 
fact, there exists a large theoretical and empirical literature on this banking crisis that 
enables a sound understanding of the complex dynamic process that led to a 
catastrophic collapse in October 2008.  
 
The dynamic process boils down to an explosive sequence of nine intertwined phases: 
 Low interest rate environment;  Housing bubble;  Sub-prime market boom;  
Formidable credit expansion;  Ignorance;  Massive retention of toxic assets;  
Housing bubble collapse and systemic risk;  Complex environment; and 	 Runs on 
the shadow banking system and fire sales.  
 
As a preparatory step to identify plausible causative factors, we start with a generally 
accepted narrative of the crisis. We sketch only the most basic outline. More detailed 
accounts are contained in the references in Table 6 (see appendix).  
 
                                                 
3 The Democrat members blamed the bankers and called for tougher regulation, while the minority 
reports from the Republicans signalized the credit bubble the Federal Reserve allowed to grow. 
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 Low interest rate environment 
 
The first phase of the sequence is given by the extended period of low interest rates 
starting in the year 2000, approximately. It is generally agreed that there were two 
concurrent factors conducive to this low interest rate environment. After the Internet 
bubble and burst: (a) the Federal Reserve feared a deflationary period and adopted a 
lax interest rate policy; and (b) excess world savings looked for safe debt investments and 
the USA experienced large and sustained capital flows from foreigners. These global 
imbalances led to the USA financial intermediaries to manufacture debt claims out of all 
types of financial products. 
 
The United States was not by any means the only country with low interest rates 
during the first quinquennium of the 2000s. Then, why the collapse first manifested 
itself in the USA? “Probably because the US innovated by securitizing sub-prime 
loans, thus drawing more marginal-credit-quality buyers into the market!” (Diamond 
and Rajan, 2009, p. 606). 
 
 Housing bubble 
 
The second phase of the sequence is the USA housing bubble where home prices 
tripled between the mid-1990s and 2006. During the 2000s the USA mortgage market 
shifted to a modus operandis in which mortgage brokers originated loans and then 
sold them to financial firms that securitized them (‘originate-to-distribute’ model). 
Quite obviously, brokers did not bear the ultimate costs of default and had no clear 
incentive to screen applicants carefully. Low interest rates, easy access to mortgage 
loans, abundant refinancing opportunities, and securitization of sub-prime loans were 
the immediate determinants of the housing bubble.  
 
 Sub-prime market boom 
 
Borrowers in the sub-prime mortgage market differ from their prime counterparts in 
several aspects, including risk, collateral, and credit histories. Indeed, sub-prime 
borrowers are riskier, possess less collateral, and have shorter or worse credit histories 
than their prime counterparts. Generally speaking, sub-prime mortgages were short-term 
hybrids with a prepayment penalty. These mortgages were allocated to borrowers with the 
lowest credit scores and highest loan-to-value ratios.  
 
The sub-prime mortgage market grew substantially between 2003 and 2005. In dollar 
terms, the share of non-prime mortgages (i.e. the aggregate of sub-prime and near-
prime mortgages) as a proportion of the total USA mortgage market grew from 10% 
in 2003 to 32% in 2005. (Mayer et al, 2009, p. 28). 
 
The empirical evidence supports the view that low short-term interest rates softened 
lending standards for companies, householders, and consumers. In particular, the sub-
prime market boom of 2001-2006 was fuelled by a decrease in lending standards, as 
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measured by a decline in loan denial rates and an increase in loan-to-income ratios. 
This softening was amplified by high securitization activity, weak supervision of bank 
capital and too low for too long interest rates.  
 
 Formidable credit expansion 
 
Financial innovation led to a formidable credit expansion that helped feed the boom in 
the housing market. In fact, the real estate boom and the corresponding leverage were 
accompanied by an extraordinary credit expansion revolving around securitization in 
residential and commercial mortgages, corporate loans and credit cards.  
 
The high demand for AAA securities by foreigners and money market funds 
magnified the re-securitization activity. In particular, the now-notorious CDOs, for 
Collateralized Debt Obligations, were designed to satisfy the high demand for AAA 
securities. Misleading ratings of these securities by the rating agencies further 
exacerbated the manufacturing of AAA tranches of CDOs. 
 
 Ignorance 
 
Conventional wisdom disregards ignorance – in the sense of lack of understanding 
about the nature of complex financial products and the risk associated with them – as 
a destabilizing factor. This is probably due to the tacit presumption that ‘transparency’ 
is ubiquitous in the contemporary economy and, consequently, ignorance cannot 
prevail. 
 
Notwithstanding, there is evidence that ignorance played an important role in the 
banking crisis 2007-08. As complex products multiplied from CDOs to CDOs of 
CDOs (or CDOs2), it became harder and harder for investors to understand what the 
quality of the underlying assets had to do with their value. The empirical evidence 
points strongly toward a conclusion that even sophisticated investors did not take into 
account the possibility of sharp declines in housing prices (neglect of tail risk) but 
also did not have credible models for pricing re-securitized debt, particularly CDOs.  
 
The former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Gordon Brown, is devastatingly 
unambiguous: 
 
We were to find that almost all the banks would have too little  
capital to cope with a mispricing of the American mortgage market.  
The entire world failed to fully understand the new financial instruments.  
But so, it transpires, had those who devised, bought, and sold them. (...) 
(Brown, 2010, p. 21) 
 
 Massive retention of toxic assets 
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Capital flows into the USA were non-speculative and in search for safety. In 
manufacturing (perceived) safe assets, the financial intermediaries took on more 
leverage, sourced assets such as sub-prime loans that carried higher risks, and retained 
toxic assets.  
 
There are at least three plausible reasons for the massive retention of toxic assets by 
financial intermediaries (banks, for short). First, the retention was due to the fact that 
banks accumulated massive risks counting on government rescue – the ‘too-big-to-
fail’ argument. Second, inappropriately designed arrangements for traders encouraged 
them to take risks unknown to the top executives – the ‘moral hazard’ argument. 
Finally, a third reason was the reluctance of large pools of investors to take any risk, 
which led to the concentration of risk in banks. Faced with high demand for riskless 
debt, banks diversified their portfolios by buying and selling risky loans. This 
diversification provoked the so-called ‘diversification myth’: banks bought risky 
loans to support the issuance of (perceived) riskless debt, increased the systematic risk 
of their portfolios, and became interconnected by sharing each other’s risks. 
 
 Housing bubble collapse and systemic risk 
 
The housing bubble burst in July 2007 and vastly increased systemic risk in the 
financial system. Decline in interest rates, easier access to mortgage loans, 
appreciation of property values, and growth in refinancing opportunities are 
individually benign market conditions, but jointly pernicious when synchronized. This 
synchronization combined with the indivisibility of residential real estate (that 
prevents home owners from deleveraging when home values decline and homeowner 
equity deteriorates) results in the so-called ‘refinancing ratchet effect’:   
 
Once property values decline, a wave of defaults becomes unavoidable 
because mortgage lenders have no mechanism such as a margin call to  
compel homeowners to add more equity to maintain their leverage ratio,  
nor can homeowners reduce their leverage in incremental steps by selling  
a portion of their homes and using the proceeds to reduce their debt.” 
(Khandani et al., 2009, p. 2).  
 
The refinancing ratchet effect gave rise to significant systemic risk in an otherwise 
geographically and temporarily diverse pool of mortgages. 
 
 Complex environment 
 
At least two different types of complexity were present during the banking crisis 
2007-08. First, structured finance created complicated and confusing products. The 
intricacies of these financial products are best illustrated by the CDOs. These esoteric 
financial products were created by investment banks to offload risk. In broad outline, 
the CDOs were created by pooling together portfolios of mortgages and then 
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separating them into different tranches (different classes of securities) with prioritized 
claims on the collateral. The process of pooling and tranching produced some 
securities that were riskier than the average asset in the collateral pool and some that 
were safer. The safest tranche was the senior tranche and the riskiest the junior 
tranche, usually referred to as ‘toxic waste.’ The senior tranches were constructed to 
receive AAA rating.4 
 
Second, there was complexity emerging from the evaluation of the financial situation 
of counterparties (who owes what to whom). We can think of the financial sector as a 
complex network of linkages. A node in this network is a bank. Banks are frequently 
evaluating the financial situation of their counterparties. This network functions 
smoothly in normal times. Even though banks do not know the financial exposures of 
the other banks with certainty the auditing problem is tractable in normal times. 
However, when a sizable shock happens – e.g. a large liquidity shock – in parts of the 
network, the number of nodes to be scrutinized by each bank rises because the shock 
may have impacted the bank’s counterparties. The auditing problem becomes 
increasingly difficult to solve and, consequently, uncertainty pervades the network. 
Faced with this uncertainty, the banks hoard liquidity. 
 
	 Runs on the shadow banking system and fire sales 
 
The term ‘shadow banking system’ refers to a section of the financial sector in which 
some financial institutions carried out activities similar to those of a traditional bank, 
but were unregulated. Investment banks financed some of their activities with 
repurchase agreements, or “repos.” Repo contracts are short-term loans collateralized 
by longer-term securities. For example, an investment bank borrows funds from a 
hedge fund by selling collateral today and promising to repurchase it tomorrow. 
Overnight financing required investment banks to roll over a substantial proportion of 
their funding on a daily basis. 
 
The fall in house prices induced a fall in the prices of securitized sub-prime mortgages 
and the disclosure that highly leveraged investment banks were holding securitized 
sub-prime mortgages shocked the financial markets. This, in turn, led to a 
deterioration of the conditions in collateralized markets. For example, haircuts 
increased and became increasingly difficult to borrow against low-quality collateral.  
 
What developed in the late 2007 and into 2008 was a run on the shadow banking 
system. The most visible of these runs was the collapse of the investment bank Bear 
Stearns. In March 2008, there was a run on Bear by its clients. These ‘depositors’ pull 
out their funds to enjoy a first-mover advantage (those who withdraw their money 
early get their full amount while those who move late might not). On March 12, 2008, 
                                                 
4 For a clear explanation of the market for CDOs and the economic motivation for CDO issuance see 
Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009a). A description of the credit rating crisis 2007-08 can be found in 
Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009b). 
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Bear was unable to secure funding on the repo market. The Federal Reserve bailed out 
Bear Stearns through an arranged merger with J.P. Morgan.  
 
Substantial liquidity interventions from the Federal Reserve, for example lending to 
banks against risky collateral, stabilized the financial sector through the first three 
quarters of 2008. In the wake of the Lehman Brothers default on 15th September, 
2008, the financial system cracked. This event revealed that the safe debt created by 
financial engineering was not truly safe.  
 
Institutions that sold Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) such as the American International 
Group (AIG) run into trouble.5 On 16th September, 2008, the Federal Reserve 
organized a bailout of AIG ($85 billion) in exchange for an 80% equity stake. Finally, 
banks’ balance sheets contracted due to massive losses on assets and withdrawals of 
short-term financing. This prompted banks to liquidate assets in fire sales. 
 
In October 2008 Knightian uncertainty was pervasive and the financial market 
conditions deteriorated precipitously. There was a freeze of the credit markets. 
Specifically, banks stopped lending; the issuance of corporate bonds, commercial 
paper, and a wide variety of other financial products largely ceased; and credit-
financed economic activity was brought to a standstill. 
 
The preceding sketch of the various phases of the banking crisis provides a number of 
factors that prima facie should be taken into account as a starting point of causation 
research. Before going into the identification of plausible causative factors, it is 
pertinent to specify a general methodology for counterfactual causation analysis that 
will be used later on. 
 
3. Counterfactual methodology 
 
The idea that causality is central to economics is at least as old as Adam Smith’s 
(1776) foundational work. Indeed, the full title of Smith’s book, An Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, signals that one of the most important 
tasks of economics is the search for explanations involving causal connections. For 
example, the importance of causal analysis to address specific policy problems is 
undeniable. 
 
The most explicit recognition of the importance of causality in economics was made 
by Alfred Marshall in his Principles of Economics. Marshall’s notion of cause-and- 
effect relation revolves around the idea of ceteris paribus change:  
 
It is sometimes said that the laws of economics are  
                                                 
5 Many buyers of CDOs tried to protect themselves by purchasing Credit Default Swaps (CDSs). The 
CDSs engendered a mirage. Worldly wisdom captured the relevance of these insurance contracts as 
follows: buying CDSs was like buying insurance for the Titanic from someone on the Titanic.  
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“hypothetical.” Of course, like every other science,  
it undertakes to study the effects which will be  
produced by certain causes, not absolutely, but  
subject to the condition that other things are equal,  
and the causes are able to work out their effects  
undisturbed. Almost every scientific doctrine, when  
carefully and formally stated, will be found to contain  
some proviso to the effect that other things are equal:  
the action of the causes in question is supposed to be  
isolated; certain effects are attributed to them, but only  
on the hypothesis that no cause is permitted to enter  
except those distinctly allowed for. 
(Marshall 1966, p. 30) [Italics in original] 
 
3.1. Dominant approaches to causality: structural and experimentalist 
 
The most influential methodologies to causation in economics are the structural (or 
econometric) approach (Heckman, 2008) and the experimental (or atheoretic) 
approach, the latter based on statistical causality (Holland, 1986). Somewhat roughly, 
econometric causality is based on structural equations models (which rely on the 
specification of systems of equations representing behavioural relationships between 
variables and parameters) and the method of controlled variation.6 Statistical causality 
is an alternative approach to econometric causality based on the Rubin causal model 
(Holland, 1986).  
 
Both econometric causality and statistical causality often take advantage of the 
presence of instrumental variables. These variables are excluded from some equations 
and included in others, so that they are correlated with some outcomes only through 
the effect on other variables. However, whereas econometric causality focuses on 
‘causes of effects,’ statistical causality focuses on the ‘effects of causes’ (Holland, 
1986, p. 945). 
 
Discussing the myriad of technical issues associated with these two leading 
approaches to causality in economics requires significant space, and we will not 
undertake this task in the present paper. There are two reasons for overlooking the 
technicalities inherent to the major approaches: first, the difference between the 
structural and the experimentalist approaches has recently been clarified by Keane 
(2010); and second, neither of them will be used in the rest of the paper. 
 
3.2. Two kinds of causation 
 
Any analysis of causality should start by bringing into sharp focus the type of 
causation to be examined. Essentially, there are two kinds of causation. First, the 
                                                 
6 This method goes back to Marshall (1966, p. 30) who repeatedly used the method of controlled 
variation in his ceteris paribus clauses. 
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analysis may refer to instances of the same phenomenon. The causal analysis of a 
reproducible phenomenon is called general causation. Typical economic examples of 
this kind of causality include: the effects of a firm’s input on its output, the effect of 
education on earnings, and the effects of employment training programs on 
subsequent labour market histories. Both the structural approach and the 
experimentalist approach have been extensively used to deal with problems that fall 
within the category of general causation. 
 
The second kind of causation analysis focuses on a dated and non-replicable 
phenomenon occurring at a particular location such as the financial crisis 1930-33 in 
the United States. Causation of the second kind is said to be singular. In this case, 
facts do not permit the type of replicability that is present in much scientific enquiry. 
Counterfactual reasoning is typically used to explore singular causality. A 
counterfactual argument requires the analyst to posit: “What would have happened if 
… had happened (or not had happened).”  
 
3.3. Hicksian approach to causality 
 
One particular approach dealing with singular causation is due to Hicks (1979). In 
rough outline, the counterfactual approach to causality involves three steps7: first, 
formulation of a counterfactual definition of ‘cause’; second, given a collection of 
plausible causative factors, distinction between separable and non-separable causes; 
and finally, causality tests.  
 
When there are several causative factors, it is necessary to distinguish ‘separable’ 
from ‘non-separable’ causes. If C is one of the causes of the effect E, then C can be a 
cause of E by itself. In this case, C is called a separable cause. But there may also be 
non-separable causes of E. It is said that a factor F is a non-separable cause of E if 
either the existence of F presupposes that C must be present or F is brought about by 
one or more separable causes. 
  
3.3.1. Strong causation (single cause) 
 
Consider two events, C and E that occurred at times T and T*, respectively, where T 
and T* are not necessarily moments of time (they can be periods of time). According 
to Hicks (1979, p. 12), to assert that C caused E presupposes that both C and E existed 
and involves positing that   
 
If C had not have happened, E would not have happened.   (1) 
 
To test this basic definition, one must construct the hypothetical situation ‘C did not 
exist’ (or briefly, ‘not-C’). The reason is easily seen. We know that C did happen, but 
                                                 
7 From now on, the expressions ‘Hicksian approach to causality’ and ‘counterfactual approach to 
causality’ will be used interchangeably.  
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we do not know what would have happened if C had not happened. In turn, the not-C 
situation requires a model or theory of the way C and E are connected. The model 
should provide reasons for thinking that events in reality may have been connected in 
the way they have been hypothesized.  
 
If we represent the expression ‘E would not have happened’ by the symbol , that is,  
 
 ≡ E would not have happened,      (2) 
 
the foregoing definition of cause can be slightly reformulated as follows: 
 
‘C caused E’ if ‘not-C produces .’     (3) 
 
This definition is only valid when C is the sole cause of E (strong causation), that is, 
when there is no other potential cause which is admitted to be a cause of E (Hicks, 
1979, p. 13).  
 
The simple logic of single cause analysis can be condensed as follows: 
 
Not-C     Conclusion 
Produces   implies C caused E 
Produces ⊕ implies C did not cause E, 
 
where  
 
⊕  ≡ ‘E would have happened,’     (4) 
 
Suppose that the event E represents the USA banking crisis 2007-08 and ask: What 
caused E? One can always answer this question specifying a cause that is so general 
as to be useless. For instance, we can claim that ‘capitalism’ was the cause of the 
banking crisis 2007-08. The sheer number and variety of elements characterizing 
‘capitalism’ makes the claim both trite and trivial. The ‘cause’ just mentioned reminds 
us what Hayek (1967) suggested many years ago. The complexity of the economy 
makes it possible for the economist to seek only the most prominent causative factors 
at work prior to the occurrence of E.  
 
3.3.2. Weak causation (multiple causes) 
 
It should be clear that if there are several potential causes (say, the separable factors 
C1, C2, C3, etc.) which may be operating to produce the effect E, the preceding 
definition requires further refinement. The reason is clear. If C1 is not the but simply a 
cause of E (but so is C2, C3, and so on), then the statement that the non-occurrence of 
C1 implies the non-occurrence of E may not be valid.  
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We now consider the simplest case of weak causation (two separable factors C1 and 
C2). It is said that C1 and C2 are causes of E if one of the following two situations 
happens:  
 
(1) The effect E does not occur when either C1 is absent or C2 is absent or both C1 
and C2 are absent 
(2) The effect E occurs if either cause is present, but it does not occur when both 
C1 and C2 are absent   
 
The first situation can be symbolically represented as follows. 
 
Situation 1  
not-C1 and C2 is present, ceteris paribus,  produces ;  
not-C2 and C1 is present, ceteris paribus, produces ;  
not-C12 ceteris paribus produces , 
 
where the symbolism not-C12 denotes a theoretical construction in which both C1 and 
C2 are absent. In this case, it is said that C1 and C2 are additive causes (Hicks, 1979, p. 
15). The present situation can be visualized with the help of Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 1 
 
Additive causes 
 
The not-C1 construction is a model that allows the evaluation of the logical 
connection between the statement “C1 absent and C2 present, ceteris paribus” and the 
mutually exclusive outcomes “ (non-occurrence of E)” and “⊕ (occurrence of E).” 
According to the first column of this table, if the statement “C1 absent and C2 present, 
ceteris paribus” is inserted into the model the effect E does not occur. A similar 
interpretation can be given to the not-C2 and not-C12 constructions. For example, the 
last column of this table asserts that within the model “C1 absent and C2 absent, 
ceteris paribus” implies the non-occurrence of E. All in all, this table asserts that the 
effect E will not happen unless both causes are present. 
 
Not-C1 Not-C2 Not-C12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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Situation 2 captures the possibility that additivity breaks down. In symbols, 
 
Situation 2  
not-C1 and C2 is present, ceteris paribus, produces ⊕;  
not-C2 and C1 is present, ceteris paribus, produces ⊕;  and  
not-C12 ceteris paribus produces  
 
This is the case of overlapping causes (Hicks, 1979, p. 15). Table 2 shows 
symbolically the essence of overlapping causes. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Table 2 
 
Overlapping causes 
 
The interpretation of the symbolisms not-C1, not-C2 and not-C12 is the same as in 
Table 1. The first and second columns of this table assert that the absence of only one 
factor (C1 or C2) is not enough to prevent the occurrence of the effect E. The message 
conveyed by this table is that the effect E will occur unless both C1 and C2 are absent.  
 
Not-C1 
 
Not-C2 
 
Not-C12 
 
⊕ 
 
 
⊕ 
 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.3.3. Limitations  
 
There can be little doubt that the counterfactual approach is a coherent methodology 
to organize thinking about singular causation. Its principal message is that theoretical 
economics is a key tool for hunting the causes of singular events that cannot be 
replicated. But praise does not imply perfection. Like most methodologies this 
approach has weaknesses. Undertaking an evaluation of the Hicksian approach to 
causality would take us too far afield.  However, one example where the methodology 
is inconclusive immediately suggests itself. Suppose that two well-specified models 
Ma and Mb are suitable to accommodate the not-C construction. Suppose, in addition, 
that model Ma produces  but model Mb produces ⊕. In this hypothetical situation, 
Hicks’ account of causation turns out to be inconclusive. We are left, in principle, 
with an indeterminate outcome.  
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4. Identifying causative factors 
 
For concreteness, the freeze in the credit markets that occurred in October 2008 is 
identified here with the effect E in the causal relationship ‘C caused E.’ It is generally 
agreed that E was caused by a combination of factors. For example, Archaya and 
Richardson (2009a) state that “There is almost universal agreement that the 
fundamental cause of the crisis was the combination of a credit boom and a housing 
bubble.” The narrative of the USA banking crisis sketched in Section 2 provides a 
source of raw material for the identification of the most prominent factors underlying 
the credit boom and the housing bubble that provoked E.  
   
4.1. Listing plausible causative factors 
 
Table 3 shows a list of nine plausible causative factors. This table omits complicating 
factors such as the refinancing ratchet effect, the rating agencies, and the CDSs 
because their role in the banking crisis was contingent on the presence of one or more 
of the items enumerated in Table 3. For example, it is evident that the CDSs delayed 
the occurrence of the financial collapse and constituted an important magnifying 
factor of wealth destruction but they cannot be held responsible for the financial 
crisis. The biggest problem was the fragility of the securities with bad loans in them, 
not the CDSs. 
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 3 
 
Factors underlying the credit boom and the housing bubble 
 
This table reports what appear to be the most important factors conducive to the credit 
boom and the housing bubble emerging from comprehensive academic research. Each 
of them suggests itself as a seemingly worthy candidate to be a cause of the USA 
banking crisis 2007-08. 
 
Plausible Causative Factor             Name 
       F1 Loose monetary policy 
       F2 Global saving glut 
       F3 Poor supervision 
       F4 Sub-prime market boom 
       F5 High securitization activity 
       F6 Re-securitization 
       F7 Ignorance 
       F8 Excessive risk-taking 
       F9 Too-big-to-fail 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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4.2. Sifting causative factors 
 
It is generally agreed that the origins of the crisis can be traced to two plausible 
causative factors F1 (loose monetary policy) and F2 (global saving glut). Lax 
monetary policy after the burst of the internet bubble combined with the high demand 
for safe securities, especially from Asian central banks, constituted enabling 
conditions for the banking crisis 2007-08.  
 
Furthermore, there is no doubt that poor supervision (causative factor F3 in Table 3) 
substantially contributed to worsening the opacity of the financial system. However, it 
would be hard to argue that this factor in isolation provoked the financial catastrophe. 
Supervision cannot restore transparency if the existing financial regulation is obsolete. 
For example, the ‘shadow banking’ system was beyond the control of the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission. 
 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) brings into sharp focus the sub-prime mortgage market 
boom (causative factor F4 in Table 3) and developed an appreciative model to show 
that one of the origins of the USA banking crisis 2007-08 was the abnormal size of 
this market. Specifically, these authors establish a link between the credit bubble and 
the deterioration of the lending standards in the sub-prime market. The model of 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) confirms that with sound lending standards the USA sub-
prime mortgage market would have remained relatively small. 
 
Allen and Carletti (2010) argue that loose monetary policy, particularly in the USA, 
and global imbalances created a bubble in real estate prices in the USA and other 
developed countries such as Spain and Ireland. These authors also argue that many 
other factors such as high securitization activity (causative factor F5 in Table 3) 
exacerbated the effects of F1 and F2. 
 
Re-securitization refers to the process of pooling and tranching a whole set of, for 
example, mortgages to spread risk differentially implemented by the investment 
banks. The archetypal example of F6 (re-securitization) is the creation of CDOs. The 
root problem with F6 was the lack of incentives to monitor the quality of the 
underlying loans. It should be clear that F6 cannot exist without securitization because 
re-securitization presupposes securitization. Therefore, F6 cannot be separated from 
F5. 
 
An efficient financial system presupposes that (a) people have easy access to all 
relevant information; (b) the availability of information automatically implies a clear 
understanding of the possibilities and limitations of the products in question; and (c) 
all risks are recognized ex-ante. For lack of a better term, we call this presumption 
postulate of full comprehension. For example, according to this postulate economic 
agents are perfectly aware of the existence of worst states of the world associated with 
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complex financial products such as the CDOs and they do not ignore the probability 
of occurrence of the worst states. 
 
If (for whatever reason) some risks associated with financial products are ignored, the 
factor F7 (ignorance) is present. Gennaioli et al. (2011a) assume that investors and 
intermediaries did not satisfy the postulate of full comprehension during the unfolding 
of the banking crisis 2007-08 because they neglected tail risks.8 They argue that, with 
the neglected risk assumption, new financial products provide false substitutes for 
truly safe bonds and the financial system is fragile. Specifically, Gennaioli et al. 
(2011a) state that, “A small piece of news that brings to investors’ minds the 
previously unattended risks catches them by surprise, causes them to drastically revise 
their valuations of new securities, and to sell them in the market.”  
 
As to the second last plausible causative factor F8 (excessive risk-taking), there is 
evidence that low interest rates induce imprudent risk-taking (Taylor, 2009); 
(Maddaloni and Peydro, 2011). This suggests that F8 was brought about by F1 (loose 
monetary policy) and F2 (global saving glut), and therefore, F8 cannot be considered 
as a separable cause of E. 
 
On the last causative factor F9 (too-big-to-fail), it is not inconceivable that the ‘too-
big-to-fail’ phenomenon may have encouraged large and complex financial 
institutions to take on too much risk. However, few economists would argue that the 
expectation that taxpayers would end up footing the bill of bank loss was one of the 
separable causes of the financial debacle at the end of 2008. It does not appear to be 
solid evidence that F9 played a key role in engendering the banking crisis. 
 
The foregoing discussion enables us to confine attention to the six factors shown in 
table 4. 
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
5.  Causality analysis of the banking crisis 2007-08 
 
The counterfactual approach to causality outlined in Section 3 provides a simple 
framework which can be applied to identify the preponderant causes of the USA 
banking crisis 2007-08. It should be emphasized that the following causality analysis 
takes for granted the existence of a set of microeconomic rules for the banking game 
compatible with banking fragility. This presupposition is based on a key lesson of the 
history of banking crises identified by Curie (2006) and Calomiris (2009). 
 
According to the counterfactual approach, the proof that S1 (loose monetary policy), 
S2 (global saving glut), S3 (poor supervision), S4 (sub-prime market), S5 (high 
                                                 
8 If investors and intermediaries ignore tail risks, it is said that the assumption of neglected risk is met. 
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securitization activity), and S6 (ignorance) are separable causes of E would require at 
least one theoretical construction capturing these key factors. In reviewing the 
literature on the banking crisis 2007-08, we have not uncovered any work that 
incorporates all these six factors into a single model. It is likely that a model explicitly 
involving such a large number of factors would be intractable or ambiguous.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 4 
 
Separable factors of the banking crisis 2007-08 
 
The identification of separable causative factors is a pre-condition to implement the 
counterfactual approach to causality. The elimination from Table 3 of F6 (re-
securitization), F8 (excessive risk-taking), and F9 (too-big-to-fail) is based on logic 
connections, empirical evidence, and lack of evidence, respectively. This leads to six 
separable factors, denoted by S1, S2, ... , S6, that were present during the credit boom 
and the housing bubble. 
 
Separable Causative Factor               Name 
       S1 Loose monetary policy 
       S2 Global saving glut 
       S3 Poor supervision 
       S4 Sub-prime market  
       S5 High securitization activity 
       S6 Ignorance 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.1. First causes and preponderant causes 
 
Faced with this stumbling block, we posit a hierarchical classification of the causative 
factors. The first causes of E are those separable causative factors that establish a 
platform for the unfolding of the banking crisis. Archaya and Richardson (2009b), and 
Rajan (2010) suggest that loose monetary policy, global imbalances, poor supervision, 
and the sub-prime market were the first causes of E. The collection of these causative 
factors can be thought of as a ‘crisis environment’ necessary –but not sufficient– for E 
to occur. To guarantee the occurrence of E, there has to be supplementary and 
powerfully operative factors. We call these high-powered factors which have to be 
embedded in the crisis environment to provoke the freeze of the credit markets, the 
preponderant causes of E.  
 
Few economists would deny that securitization and ignorance were powerfully 
operative factors at work prior to the occurrence of E. However, to argue that there 
are reasons to believe that S5 and S6 constituted important separable factors in the 
context of the banking crisis is not the same as showing that they were, in fact, the 
preponderant causes of the crisis. 
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5.2. Structure of the proof 
 
Using the counterfactual approach to causation, it will be shown that C1 
(securitization) and C2 (ignorance) were the preponderant causes of the crisis and 
these separable causes were additive.9 To this end, it is necessary to find one or more 
economic models such that the following conditions are satisfied: 
 
  C1 is absent while C2 is present ceteris paribus imply  
E does not happen; 
  C2 is absent while C1 is present ceteris paribus imply  
E does not happen; and 
         both C1 and C2 are absent ceteris paribus imply 
E does not happen, 
where the ceteris paribus clause includes the first causes of E. 
 
Gennaioli et al. (2011b) have developed a model of shadow banking that brings into 
sharp focus the implications of risk allocation through securitization. The risky loans 
generated by the financial intermediaries are subject both to idiosyncratic risk and to 
systematic risk. Outside investors are only interested in riskless debt. Securitization 
enables the diversification of idiosyncratic risk, promotes the expansion of the banks’ 
balance sheets, and increases the links among them. In their model, a high level of 
investor wealth triggered a chain reaction: expanded securitization, growing leverage, 
growing assets of the intermediate sector, lower interest rates, and increased bank 
risk-taking. 
 
The novel result of the shadow banking model is that the elimination of intermediary-
specific idiosyncratic risks by securitization to underpin the issuance of (perceived) 
riskless debt raises the exposure of these intermediaries to the tail aggregate risks. Or, 
to put it differently, the model of shadow banking predicts the ‘diversification myth.’ 
This result is valid under either the rational expectations assumption or the ‘neglected 
risk’ assumption.  
 
It should be clear that the rational expectations assumption implies that the postulate 
of full comprehension is valid. It should also be clear that the failure to recognize 
risks ex-ante implies ignorance. What may not be as obvious is that under rational 
expectations the shadow banking system is very stable, but the neglected risk 
assumption renders the shadow banking system extremely fragile. The source of 
instability is the neglect of aggregate risk (Gennaioli et al., 2011b). 
 
 
                                                 
9 The change in notation from S5 and S6 to C1 and C2, respectively, is just to facilitate contact with 
Section 3. 
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5.3. Proof of additive causality 
 
Using the shadow banking model as a theoretical construction to test for causality, it 
is not difficult to prove that C1 and C2 are additive causes of the credit market freeze. 
As mentioned previously, the proof of causation with two separable factors requires 
the logical analysis of three distinct cases.  
 
Proof of Case . In the absence of securitization, the shadow banking system is stable 
even under the neglected risk assumption. The reason is obvious. If there is no 
securitization activity, bank interdependence cannot grow. 
 
Proof of Case . When securitization exists and all market participants hold rational 
expectations, the shadow banking system is stable, and therefore, the banking crisis 
cannot happen. 
 
Proof of Case . A trivial prediction of the shadow banking model is that a banking 
crisis cannot occur in the absence of both securitization and ignorance. This 
completes the proof.  
 
Table 5 provides a schematic view of the causality proof. It is easily seen that the 
collection of the first causes together with the preponderant causes constitutes a 
minimal sufficient condition for E to occur. This set consists of six separable 
causative factors (see Table 4) and is ‘minimal’ in the sense that it does not contain 
redundant conditions. 
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
6. Summary and concluding remarks  
 
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was created by both the USA Congress and 
the President to answer the question: What caused the USA banking crisis 2007-08? 
The Commission interviewed more than 700 witnesses, held 19 days of public 
hearings, examined millions of pages of documents, and published a 545-page report. 
(FCIR, 2011). Using a narrative approach the report established that the crisis had 
many causes and identified them. 
  
Both the majority’s report and the dissenting statements are an account of events 
without a clear methodological framework. Any identification of causes in this 
fashion, even as a suggestive rather than a substantial result, must meet some 
minimum methodological requirements to underpin its validity. Unfortunately, FCIR 
(2011) does not define the meaning of ‘cause.’ It also does not make use of any 
methodology for causation analysis applicable to single non-replicable events. There 
are no tests to indicate if the identified factors were, in fact, separable causes of the 
banking crisis. 
22 
  
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 5 
 
Schematic view of the causality proof 
 
The proof that securitization and ignorance were the preponderant causes of the USA 
financial crisis 2007-08 is based in the Gennaioli-Shleifer-Vishny model of shadow 
banking. The last row in Table 5 shows that inserting into this model the assumptions 
corresponding to each case implies that the credit market freeze does not occur. Or, to 
put it differently, the crisis does not happen unless both C1 and C2 are present. 
 
 
   
              
                      Cases 
 
Causes 
 
 
Case  
 
 
 
Case  
 
 
 
Case  
 
 
C1 
(Securitization) 
 
Absent 
 
Present 
 
Absent 
 
C2 
(Ignorance) 
 
Present 
 
Absent 
 
Absent 
 
E 
(Credit Market Freeze) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
To structure our exploration of the causes of the financial crisis 2007-08, we started 
with a condensed narrative of the crisis. That allowed us to identify nine plausible 
causative factors (see Table 3). Three factors, namely: re-securitization, excessive 
risk-taking, and too-big-to-fail were discarded for different reasons (logical 
connection with securitization, empirical link with loose monetary policy, and lack of 
solid evidence, respectively). As a result, we arrived at a list of six separable causative 
factors shown in Table 4.  
 
The counterfactual approach to causality uses theoretical economics in a fundamental 
way. To implement the causality tests, we need at least one theoretical construction 
connecting all six causative factors. Regrettably, there is no formal model explicitly 
capturing such large number of factors. However, there is persuasive evidence that 
loose monetary policy, global saving glut, poor supervision, and the sub-prime market 
were necessary conditions for the banking crisis to occur. It is for this reason that we 
consider them as the first causes of the banking crisis.  
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The set of first causes constitutes the ‘crisis environment.’ To guarantee that the 
freeze of the credit markets happens, there must be supplementary and powerfully 
operative factors at work in addition to the first causes, such as high securitization 
activity and ignorance. We call these additional factors the preponderant causes of the 
banking crisis.  
 
Evidently, we know that the freeze of the credit markets did happen in October 2008 
and that both C1 (securitization) and C2 (ignorance) were present; we do not know, in 
the same way, what would have happened if both C1 and C2 did not happen. The 
counterfactual approach to causality enables us to answer this question with the help 
of economic models. Using the path-breaking model of shadow banking developed by 
Gennaioli et al. (2011b), together with the counterfactual approach to causality, we 
have shown that securitization and ignorance were the preponderant causes of the 
USA banking crisis 2007-08. 
 
As a final remark in this paper, we should mention the relationship between necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the USA banking crisis 2007-08 to occur. As mentioned 
before, the set of first causes is a set of necessary conditions for E to occur. When we 
embed the preponderant causes into the crisis environment, we generate a set of six 
causative factors that constitutes a minimal sufficient condition for E to occur. 
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Appendix 
 
The purpose of this appendix is to present in tabular form the anatomy of the USA 
banking crisis 2007-08 together with a small sample of academic references extracted 
from the massive literature associated with this crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6 HERE 
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Table 6 
 
Anatomy of the USA banking crisis 2007-08 and key references  
This table provides the anatomy of the banking crisis and indicates some of the key 
references associated with each of the nine intertwined phases of the USA banking 
crisis 2007-08. 
 
Crisis intertwined 
phases 
Central facts Sample of key 
references  
 Low interest rate  
     environment 
After the Internet bubble and burst, the 
Federal Reserve adopted a lax interest rate 
policy, and the USA experience large capital 
inflows from foreign central banks and 
governments seeking for safe investments. 
 
(Brunnermeier, 
2009); (Caballero et 
al., 2008); 
(Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy, 
2009); (Diamond 
and Rajan, 2009); 
 (Taylor, 2009) 
 Housing bubble A housing bubble inflates in the mid-2000s. 
The USA home prices tripled between the 
mid-1990s and 2006.  
Case (2008);  
(Mayer et al. 2009). 
 Sub-prime market  
     boom 
Lending to risky borrowers grew rapidly in 
the 2000s. Deteriorating lending standards in 
the mortgage market contributed to the 
expansion of the sub-prime market. The 
number of sub-prime mortgages nearly 
doubled between 2003 and 2005. Non-prime 
lending levelled off in 2006. 
(Dell’Ariccia et al., 
2008); (Mayer et al., 
2009); 
(Maddaloni and 
Peydro, 2011) 
 Formidable  
     credit expansion 
The housing bubble was accompanied by a 
major credit expansion not only in the 
residential mortgage area but also in 
commercial mortgages and credit card 
finance. The insatiable demand for AAA 
securities magnified the re-securitization 
activity. Leading rating companies reinforced 
the hyperactive process of re-securitization 
through misleading ratings of these 
securities. 
(Benmelech and 
Dlugosz, 2009b); 
(Coval et al. 2009); 
(Mian and Sufi 
2009). 
 Ignorance  
 
Complex bundles of obligations that was 
thought to spread risk efficiently, made the 
resulting financial products extremely non-
transparent. Market participants, including 
the rating agencies, did not understand the 
risks of the mortgage-related securities. The 
difficulty of understanding the riskiness of 
financial products such as CDOs was due to 
the intricacies of the financial engineering 
process.  
(Brown, 2010); 
(Coval et al., 2009); 
(Gennaioli et al. 
2011a); (Gerardi et 
al., 2008);  (Jarrow 
et al., 2007). 
 
 
 Massive retention  
    of toxic assets 
Re-securitization resulted in a massive 
retention of toxic assets by financial 
intermediaries. There are three possible 
explanations for such retention: ‘too-big-to-
fail,’ ‘moral hazard,’ and ‘diversification 
myth.’ 
 
 (Brown, 2010); 
(Gennaioli et al. 
2011b); (Rajan, 
2010); (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2010a). 
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Table 6 –Continued  
 
 
Crisis intertwined 
phases 
Central facts Sample of key 
references   
 
 Housing bubble  
     collapse and   
     systemic risk 
The triggering event of the banking crisis 
was the crash in the housing bubble. Non-
prime lending drop drastically in the first half 
of 2007. The USA home prices fell 
spectacularly by about 30% in 2007-2009. As 
the housing bubble collapsed, sub-prime 
mortgages began to default. The 2007 
dramatic fall in non-prime originations was 
accompanied by a sharp rise in delinquencies 
rates and vastly increased systemic risk. The 
impact of these defaults was greatly 
magnified by the ‘refinancing ratchet effect,’ 
and the complex bundling of obligations, e.g. 
CDOs. 
 (Mayer et al., 2009) 
 (Khandani et al., 
2009) 
Complex  
     environment 
 
 
Complex 
financial 
products 
 
 
Complex 
auditing 
problem 
Complexity stemmed from complicated 
financial products and the difficulty in 
assessing counterparty risk. 
 
The slicing and dicing through repeated 
securitization of the original package of 
mortgages originated very complex securities 
difficult to value. 
 
When a sizable shock to the financial system 
happens, the number of counterparties to be 
audited rises. The problem becomes too 
complex for the banks to figure out. 
 
 
 
 
(Benmelech and 
Dlugosz, 2009a); 
(Buchhiet, 2008) 
 
 
(Caballero and 
Simsek, 2009a) 
 
	 Runs on the   
     shadow banking    
     system and fire  
     sales 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A run on the shadow banking system 
developed in the late 2007 and into 2008. 
After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
investment bank in September 2008, 
disturbing events rolled out in quick 
succession (particularly, bad news about the 
value of mortgage-backed securities used as 
collateral in the repo contracts). As the value 
of mortgage-back securities fell and 
uncertainty about their future increased, 
many forms of short-term financing such as 
repos dried up. 
 
Collateralized lending was the most common 
mechanism that precipitated forced sales of 
assets. 
(Adrian and Shin, 
2010); 
(Brunnermeier, 
2009); (Gorton and 
Metrick, 2009, 
2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Caballero and 
Simsek, 2009a) 
 (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2010b, 
2010c) 
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